Udgass 0.6.0 · early development
Architecture and deployment
One program on your computer. Nothing hosted.
For technical reviewers and security teams: how Udgass is built, where data goes, what protects it, and what does not exist yet. Every statement here was checked against the 0.6.0 source code. Udgass is proprietary software; evaluators can ask to review the code under confidentiality terms.
Data flow
From your exports to a recorded decision
Your computer
- Your exportsCSV or .xlsx: sales, stock counts, purchase orders, events. Read, never changed.
- ImportPreview first: rows rejected and why, column mapping, coverage. Nothing is stored until committed.
- One SQLite databaseEvery record keeps the day it describes and when it was recorded. Corrections add rows; nothing is overwritten.
- AnalysesPatterns, forecasts with ranges, backtests, reorder suggestions, scenarios, decision analysis. Each uses only data known at its date.
- Claims and decision recordsEach result is stored with its inputs, method, uncertainty and limits. Decisions are an append-only chain.
- Web app and APIOn 127.0.0.1:8765. Every data request needs a key with a role; only a status check does not.
Outbound, admin action only
Lemon Squeezy licence checkLicence key and installation name. Never your data.KPAppWorx
Receives nothingNo telemetry, no account, no hosted copy. Sharing a report is your choice.The free Health Check (udgass assess) is separate and stricter: it works in a temporary database that is deleted when it finishes and writes only the report you name. A test runs it in a fresh interpreter and checks that no network module is even loaded.
Components
What is in the package
A modular monolith in one Python package, standard library only. All database access lives in the engine modules; nothing in the API layer touches SQL, so a later move to a server database is contained work.
engine/db | SQLite store, versioned migrations (schema 11), and database triggers that reject updates and deletes on forecasts, runs, evaluations, scenarios, findings, decision records and the audit log. |
|---|---|
engine/ingest, connectors | Validation, mapping, preview and commit; idempotent; corrections versioned; declared and assumed coverage of each export. One connector type today: files (CSV, .xlsx values only, SQLite tables, JSON records). |
engine/forecasting, selection, models | Forecast runs, backtests against simple methods, and a forecaster chosen per company by replaying a stock policy on its own history. Model policy changes need a stored backtest that beats the current one. |
engine/recommend, scenarios, decide | Reorder suggestions at a target fill rate and budget; weekly Monte Carlo scenarios on shared random draws; trade-off frontier and value of information. |
engine/claimstore, decisions, outcomes | Typed, content-addressed claims with lineage; decision records as a hash chain; outcomes of recorded cycles, chosen against suggested. |
engine/tenancy, audit, governance, integrity | Organisations, keys and roles; the append-only audit log; export and purge; signed integrity checkpoints kept outside the database. |
bench | The benchmark harness behind the evidence page: hash-pinned datasets, a sealed held-out register, rolling origins, paired comparisons. |
licensing | Early Access licence checks. Loaded only when an admin activates, refreshes or deactivates a licence. |
Security controls
What exists, and what each one does not do
| Control | How it works | Limit |
|---|---|---|
| Network exposure | Listens on 127.0.0.1 only. Any other address is refused without a TLS certificate, unless an explicit unsafe flag is passed. | No built-in firewall, rate limits reset on restart. |
| Keys and roles | Random 256-bit keys, stored only as SHA-256 hashes, shown once. Roles: viewer, analyst, admin. The organisation comes from the key, never from the request. | A key is not a person: no single sign-on, no per-person identity. Two keys held by one person look like two approvers. |
| Immutability | Database triggers reject updates and deletes on results, decision records and the audit log; corrections are new rows. | Someone with write access to the file itself can bypass triggers. |
| Tamper evidence | Decision records are hash-chained and verifiable. Checkpoints (counts and SHA-256 digests, no data) can be signed with HMAC-SHA256 and stored elsewhere. | Tamper-evident, not tamper-proof: detection needs a checkpoint copy the attacker cannot reach. |
| Data at rest | One SQLite file in a place you choose; verified backup and full export commands; purge of one organisation. | Not encrypted by Udgass. Use disk encryption. |
| Supply chain | No third-party dependencies in the core. The kit is built reproducibly (identical bytes on rebuild) with a CycloneDX SBOM and SHA-256 sums of every file. Static analysis and dependency audit in the release checks. | The kit is not code-signed. No independent security review or penetration test. |
| Licence enforcement | Engine analyses above 25 products need an Early Access licence (HTTP 402 otherwise). Health Check, imports, records and export are never blocked. | A commercial control in readable source, backed by terms, not a technical protection. |
Deployment
Ways to run it today
One computer (recommended for evaluation)
- Python 3.9 or newer on Windows, macOS or Linux; nothing else to install
udgass admin create-org, thenudgass serve; open http://127.0.0.1:8765- The engine guide supplied with the software walks through every screen
A team on your network
- One machine runs
servewith a TLS certificate you provide - Each person gets a key with the role they need
- One process, one writer at a time; long analyses run in the request (a 500-series backtest takes about 18 seconds)
Udgass has no production deployments. The 0.6.0 kit passed its acceptance checks and its 568 tests on Linux with Python 3.9 and 3.13. An earlier kit’s assessment was run on Windows 11 (24 October 2026). A run on Windows or macOS by someone outside KPAppWorx has not yet been recorded.
Not built yet
What an enterprise would need that does not exist
| Identity | Not built. Single sign-on (OIDC, SAML) and per-person identity. |
|---|---|
| Encryption at rest | Not built. Relies on disk encryption. |
| Server database, hosting | Not built. No PostgreSQL option, no hosted or high-availability deployment, no job queue. |
| System connectors | Not built. PostgreSQL, Snowflake, Databricks, SAP, Oracle and REST connectors are designed, not built. Exports only. |
| One simulation engine | In progress. The scenario screen uses a weekly Monte Carlo model; a stricter daily stock ledger (lots, transfers, commitments) is used only by the benchmarks so far. |
| Certifications | None. No SOC 2, ISO 27001 or penetration test. |